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This paper shows that the monetary policy paradigm that was in place before the financial crisis 
worked  very  well  and  that  the  crisis  occurred  only  after  policy  makers  deviated  from  that 
paradigm. The paper also evaluates monetary policy during the financial crisis by dividing the 
crisis  into  three  periods:  pre-panic,  panic  and  post-panic.  It  shows  that  the  extraordinary 
measures did not work well in the pre-panic or the post-panic periods; instead they helped bring 
on  the  panic,  even  though  they  may  have  some  positive  impact  during  the  panic.  The 
implication of the paper is that the crisis does not call for a new paradigm for monetary policy. 







   
 
In this paper I want address the question of whether the financial crisis in 2007-2009 suggests 
that a new paradigm is needed for monetary policy
1.  I begin with a short description of the 
paradigm that existed before the crisis, and I then evaluate the types of extraordinary monetary 
policy actions that were undertaken before, during, and after the panic which occurred in the fall 
of 2008.  I also consider the problem of an exit strategy from these extraordinary measures.  The 
empirical and policy analysis are drawn largely from the United States experience, but I believe 
that the policy implications apply more broadly. 
 
2. A Framework That Worked 
   
 
What are the key characteristics of the paradigm for monetary policy that were in place in the 
decades before the crisis?  I would focus on these four:  First, the short term interest rate (the 
federal funds rate in the United States) is determined by the forces of supply and demand in the 
money market. Second, the central bank (the Federal Reserve in the United States) adjusts the 
supply of money or reserves to bring about a desired target for the short term interest rate; there 
is thus a link between the quantity of money or reserves and the interest rate. Third, the central 
bank has a strategy, or rule, to adjust the interest rate depending on economic conditions:  In 
general, the interest rate rises by a certain amount when inflation increases above its target and 
the  interest  rate  falls  when  by  a  certain  amount  when  the  economy  goes  into  a  recession.  
Fourth, to maintain its independence and focus on its main objectives of inflation control and 
macroeconomic stability, the central bank does not allocate credit or engage in fiscal policy by 
adjusting the composition of its portfolio toward or away from certain firms or sectors. The so-
                                                           
1 The paper was prepared for presentation at a seminar organized jointly by CASE – Center for Social and Economic 
Research and the Department of the Global Economy at the Warsaw School of Economics and held in Warsaw on 23 
June 2010.   
 






called  Taylor  rule  is  an  example  of  how  interest  rates  are  changed  in  the  third  part  of  this 
framework.  
The  desirability  or  optimality  of  such  a  framework  was  derived  from  empirical  models  with 
rational  expectations  and  sticky  prices  first  constructed  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  and  now 
continuing with many refinements.  Figure 1 provides a list of many of these empirical monetary 
models which continue to be updated and modified.   
 
  Figure 1: Examples of empirical monetary models 
Woodford, Rotemberg (1997) 
Levin Wieland Williams (2003)
Clarida Gali Gertler (1999) 
Clarida Gali Gertler 2-Country (2002) 
McCallum, Nelson (1999)
Fuhrer & Moore (1995) 
FRB Monetary Studies, Orphanides, Wieland (1998) 
FRB-US model linearized by Levin, Wieland, Williams (2003) 
CEE/ACEL Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Linde (2004)
FRB-US model 08 mixed expectations, linearized by Laubach
(2008) 
Smets Wouters (2007) 
New Fed US Model by Edge Kiley Laforte (2007)
Coenen Wieland (2005) (Taylor or Fuhrer-Moore stag. Contracts)
ECB Area Wide model linearized by Kuester & Wieland (2005) 
Smets and Wouters (2003) 
Euro Area Model of Sveriges Riksbank (Adolfson et al. 2008a)
QUEST III:  Euro Area Model of the DG-ECFIN EU
ECB New-Area Wide Model of Coenen, McAdam, Straub (2008)
RAMSES Model of Sveriges Riskbank, Adolfson et al.(2008b)
Taylor (1993) G7 countries 
Coenen and Wieland (2002, 2003)  G3 countries 
IMF model of euro area Laxton & Pesenti (2003)












Figure 2 shows how three of these models (the ones in red type, for example) respond to a 
monetary  policy  shock—a  deviation  from  Taylor-type  rules;  note  that  there  is  considerable 
agreement about the impact on output and inflation.  The overall approach is built on earlier 






monetary policy rule  which cushioned the economy from shocks and did not cause its own 
shocks.  
Figure 2: The Effect of Policy Shock on Interest Rates, Output and Inflation 








Experience has shown that such an approach worked well in the real world. Performance was 
good when policy was close to rule; performance was poor when policy was far away from rule. 
Figures 3 and 4 provide evidence from the United States.  Figure 3 is drawn from research at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (it is Figure 2 from a paper by Judd and Trehan) and 
Figure 4 is drawn from research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The figures indicate 
the periods when policy was close, or not so close, to this type of policy framework.  Note 
especially in Figure 4 that policy deviated from the framework, at least as characterized by the 
Taylor rule, in the 2002-2005 period leading up to the financial crisis. Rarely in economics is 
there so much empirical and theoretical evidence in support of a particular policy. 
 
Figure 3: Federal Funds Rate: Actual vs. Rule’s Prescription for Fed Behavior 
 






Figure 4: Greenspan Years: Federal Fund Rate and Taylor Rule 
From William Poole, “Understanding the Fed”
St. Louis Review, Jan/Feb 2007
 
    
3. Extraordinary Measures of 2007-2010 
   
 
In addition to the interest rate setting during the period from 2002 to 2005, monetary policy 
deviated from the traditional framework that worked during the crisis by implementing a large 
number of new measures.   Figure 5 summarizes the Fed‘s extraordinary measures—mostly 
special loan and securities purchase programs—going back to 2007 when the financial crisis 
first flared up in the money markets.  Figure 6 shows the impact of these on the Fed‘s balance 
sheet. Figures 7 and 10 show how the programs have changed in size during this period, either 
adding to or subtracting from the Fed‘s balance sheet.  
 






















































































































































































































Some of the programs, such as the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) purchase program and 
the  Term  Asset  Backed  Securities  Loan  Facility  (TALF),  have  expanded  [Figure  10],  while 
others, such as the Term Auction Facility (TAF) or the SWAP facility with foreign central banks, 
have  contracted  [Figures  7  and  8].  Some  programs  have  been  closed  down,  including  the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), and the 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).  But the 
loans and other vehicles used to bailout the creditors of Bear Stearns and AIG are still on the 
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The Fed has financed these programs mostly by creating money—crediting banks with reserve 
balances  at  the  Fed—or  by  selling  other  items  in  its  portfolio.  From  December  2007  until 
September 2008 it sold other items in its portfolio. Since September 2008 it has added to its 
reserve balances and expanded its balance sheet. During the past year, reserve balances have 
continued  to  rise  as  expanding  programs  have  kept  pace  with  contracting  programs  and 
Treasury has withdrawn deposits from the Fed. For the two weeks ending February 3, 2010, 
reserve balances were $1,127 billion, up from $662 billion during the same period in February 
2009. These reserves are still far in excess of normal levels and will eventually have to be 
wound down to prevent a significant rise in inflation. By way of comparison, reserve balances 
were only $9 billion during the same period in February 2008.   
 
 
4. Assessing the Impact of Extraordinary Measures  
 
 
Determining  whether  or  not  these  programs  have  worked  is  difficult.  First,  there  are  many 
programs,  and  they  interact  with  each  other.    In  addition  to  the  Fed‘s  actions,  other  U.S. 
government agencies undertook extraordinary interventions, including the takeover of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) and the guarantee of money market portfolios.  Moreover, many of the 
programs were significantly reworked after they were implemented—the switch of the TARP 
from a program to purchase toxic assets to one of injecting capital into banks was perhaps the 
biggest reworking.  Second, financial conditions and the entire global economy were changing 
rapidly  around  the  time  of  these  interventions,  and  markets  were  dynamically  reacting  and 
adjusting  to  the  changes.  Third,  developing  a  counterfactual  to  describe  what  would  have 
happened in the absence of the programs requires analyzing large quantities of data, and using, 
when possible, economic models and statistical techniques.   
  
Perhaps for these reasons, there has been surprisingly little empirical work on this important 
question.  Peter Fisher (2009) and James Hamilton (2009b) stress the difficulty of the task. In 






(Taylor 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b), (Taylor and Williams 2008), (Stroebel and Taylor 2009), 
which has focused on several of the programs including the TAF, the PDCF, the MBS purchase 
program, and the bailouts, all in the context of overall monetary policy, including its possible role 
as one of the causes of the crisis.    
 
4.1. Three Phases of the Crisis 
 
I divide the assessment of the programs into three periods. The first period runs from the flare-
up in August 2007 until the severe financial panic in late September 2008.  The second period is 
the panic itself; based on equity prices and interbank borrowing rates, the panic period was 
concentrated in late September through October 2008 as it spread rapidly around the world, 
turning the recession into a great recession.  The third period occurs after the panic.  Thus the 
financial crisis and the Fed‘s actions are naturally divided into three periods: pre-panic, panic, 
and post-panic.  
 
Before the Panic My assessment is that the extraordinary measures taken in the period leading 
up to the panic did not work, and that some were harmful.  The TAF did little to reduce tension in 
the interbank markets during this period, as I testified to the House Committee on Financial 
Services in February 2008 (Taylor 2008a) based on research reported in Taylor and Williams 
(2008),  and  it  drew  attention  away  from  counterparty  risks  in  the  banking  system.    The 
extraordinary bailout measures, which began with Bear Stearns, were the most harmful in my 
view.  The Fed‘s justification for the use of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act in the case 
of Bear Sterns led many to believe that the Fed‘s balance sheet would again be available in the 
case that another similar institution, such as Lehman Brothers, failed.  But when the Fed was 
unsuccessful in getting private firms to help rescue Lehman over the weekend of September 13-
14, 2008, it surprisingly cut off access to its balance sheet. Then, the next day, it reopened its 
balance sheet to make loans to rescue the creditors of AIG.  It was then turned off again, so a 
new program, the TARP, was proposed.  Event studies show that the chaotic roll out of the 
TARP then coincided with the severe panic in the following weeks (Taylor 2008b). The Fed‘s on-
again off-again bailout measures were thus an integral part of a generally unpredictable and 
confusing government response to the crisis which, in my view, led to panic.   






During the Panic This is the most complex period to analyze because the Fed‘s main measures 
during  this  period—the  AMLF  and  the  CPFF—were  intertwined  with  the  FDIC  bank  debt 
guarantees and the clarification on October 13, after three weeks of uncertainty, that the TARP 
would be used for equity injections. This clarification was a major reason for the halt in the panic 
in my view (Taylor 2008b). Based on conversations with traders and other market participants 
the Fed‘s actions taken during the panic, especially the AMLF and the CPFF, were helpful in 
rebuilding  confidence  in  money  market  mutual  funds  and  stabilizing  the  commercial  paper 
market. The Federal Reserve should also be given credit for rebuilding confidence by quickly 
starting up these complex programs from scratch in a turbulent period and for working closely 
with  central  banks  abroad  in  setting  up  swap  lines  (Fisher  2009).    However,  most  of  the 
evidence  is  anecdotal,  and  it  would  be  useful  if  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  with  its  inside 
information about day to day events and data, examined the programs empirically and reported 
the  results.    For  example,  statistical  evidence  (Taylor  2009a)  indicates  that  the  PDCF  was 
effective  in  reducing  risk  (measured  by  rates  on  credit  default  swaps)  at  Merrill  Lynch  and 
Goldman Sachs in October 2009.  
 
After the Panic The two measures introduced by the Fed following the severe panic period 
were the MBS program and the TALF. Of these two, the MBS has turned out to be much larger 
as shown in Figure 10, and it will soon reach $1.25 trillion. As with the other Fed programs there 
has been little empirical work assessing the impact of the MBS program on mortgage interest 
rates. My assessment, based on research with Johannes Stroebel, is that it has had a rather 
small effect on mortgage rates once one controls for prepayment risk and default risk, but the 
estimates are uncertain.  I have not studied the impacts of the TALF; it has been very slow to 
start and it is still quite small.  In the absence of the MBS program, reserve balances and the 
size of the Fed‘s balance sheet would already be back to normal levels before the crisis.  If it 
were not for this program, the Fed would have already exited from its emergency measures 
removing considerable uncertainty about its exit strategy going forward.  
 
4.2. Legacy Problems 
   
Whether one believes that these programs worked or not, there are reasons to believe that their 
consequences  going  forward  are  negative.  First,  they  raise  questions  about  central  bank 






policy or credit allocation policy (Goodfriend 2009) or industrial policy (Taylor 2009b) because 
they try to help some firms or sectors and not others and are financed through money creation 
rather than taxes or public borrowing. Unlike monetary policy, there is no established rationale 
that such policies should be run by an independence agency of government (Thornton 2009). By 
taking these extraordinary measures, the Fed has risked losing its independence over monetary 
policy (Shultz 2009).  
 
A second negative consequence of the programs is that unwinding them involves considerable 
risks. In order to unwind the programs in the current situation, for example, the Fed must reduce 
the size of its MBS portfolio and reduce reserve balances. But there is uncertainty about how 
much impact the purchases have had on mortgage interest rates, and thus there is uncertainty 
about how much mortgage interest rates will rise as the MBS are sold. There is also uncertainty 
and disagreement about why banks are holding so many excess reserves now (Keister and 
McAndrews 2009).  If the current level of reserves represents the amount banks desire to hold, 
then reducing reserves could cause a further reduction in bank lending.    
 
A third negative consequence is the risk of inflation (Hamilton 2009a). If the Fed finds it politically 
difficult to reduce the size of the balance sheet as the economy recovers and as public debt 
increases, then inflationary pressures will undoubtedly increase.    
 
 
5. Returning to the Framework that Worked  
   
 
For these reasons, it is important for central banks that have deviated from the paradigm that 
worked, to return, as soon as possible, to that paradigm. A strategy for such a return must focus 
on three things: (1) the federal funds rate, (2) the level of reserve balances (or the size of the 
central bank‘s balance sheet), and (3) the composition of the central bank‘s portfolio of assets. 
In order to achieve this goal the direction of change of all three is clear: The interest rate must 
move to its normal level, the amount of reserves must decline, and the proportion of the Fed‘s 
assets dedicated to the extraordinary programs such as TALF, MBS, and the Bear-Stearns-AIG 






depend  on  economic  conditions.  In  particular  the  interest  rate  should  be  increased  as  the 
economy recovers. If the economy weakens, the tightening should be postponed. If inflation 
picks up, tightening should be accelerated. 
   
 Such  an  exit  strategy  is  more  than  a  list  of  instruments.  It  is  a  policy  describing  how  the 
instruments will be adjusted over time until the monetary framework is reached. It is analogous 
to a policy rule for the interest rate in a monetary framework except that it also describes the 
level of reserves and the composition of the balance sheet. Hence, an exit strategy for monetary 
policy is essentially an exit rule.  
 
How would such an exit rule work? One possible rule would link the Fed‘s decisions about the 
interest rate with its decisions about the level of reserves. In other words, when the Fed decides 
to start increasing the federal funds rate target, it would also reduce reserve balances. One 
reasonable exit rule  would reduce reserve balances by $100 billion for each 25 basis point 
increase in the federal funds rate. By the time the funds rate hits 2 percent, the level of reserves 
would be reduced by $800 billion and would likely be near the range needed for supply and 
demand equilibrium in the money market.  






















































































































































Effective Federal Funds Rate
(right scale)






Where does the ―$100 billion per quarter point‖ come from?  We do not know much about the 
reserve-interest rate relationship, but $100bn per 25bps is close to what was observed when the 
Fed started increasing reserves in the fall of 2008. As shown in Figure 11 the funds rate fell from 
2 percent to 0 percent as the Fed increased the supply of reserves by $800 billion. Of course we 
do not know if this relationship will hold now with changed circumstances in the banking sector, 
but it is a reasonable place to begin. In addition, these dollar amounts are not so large that they 
should constrain banks or put upward pressure on mortgage rates or other long term rates as 
the Fed‘s MBS or other assets are sold to enable the reduction in reserves. An attractive feature 
of this approach is that the Fed would exit unorthodoxly at the same 2 percent interest rate as it 
entered unorthodoxly: The federal funds rate was at 2 percent when it started financing its loans 
and securities purchases by increasing reserves and the balance sheet.   
   
This exit strategy could be announced to the markets with a degree of precision that the Fed 
deems appropriate for preserving flexibility. Of course, the Fed would not reduce reserves by the 
full amount on the day of the interest rate decision. Rather it would be spread out over weeks or 
months. Policy makers could treat this exit rule as an exit guideline rather than a mechanical 
formula  to  be  followed  literally.  They  would  vote  on  how  much  to  reduce  reserves  at  each 
meeting along with the interest rate vote.  
   
Perhaps the biggest advantage of such an exit strategy is that it is predictable. It would reduce 
uncertainty about the central bank‘s unwinding while providing enough flexibility to adjust if the 
exit appears to be too rapid or too slow. The strategy would likely have a beneficial effect on 
bank lending and thereby remove a barrier to more rapid growth: Some banks are apparently 
reluctant to buy mortgage securities because of uncertainty about the prices of the securities 
during an exit. This strategy would reduce that uncertainty and allow market participants to start 






6. Concluding Remarks 
  
   
 
What are the implications of all this for the question of whether or not we need to change the 
monetary paradigm?  The crisis certainly gives no reason to abandon the core empirical ―rational 
expectations/sticky price‖ monetary model developed over the past 30 years. Whether you call 
this  type  of  model  ―dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium,‖  or  ―new  Keynesian,‖  or  ―new 
neoclassical macroeconomics,‖ it is the type of model from which modern monetary policy rules 
and  recommendations  were  derived.    Along  with  rational  expectations  came  reasons  for 
predictable, rule-like policies: time inconsistency, credibility, and the Lucas critique, or simply the 
practical need to evaluate macro policy as a rule. Along with the sticky prices came specific 
monetary rules which dealt with the dynamics implied by those rigidities as fit to actual macro 
data.  These models did not fail in their recommendations for rules-based monetary and fiscal 
policies.   
   
It is easy to criticize the rational expectations/sticky price models by saying that they do not 
admit enough rigidities, or have only one interest rate, or do not have money in them.  But we 
should not confuse useful simplified versions of models, which frequently boil down to only three 
equations, with more detailed models used for policy. By focusing on such smaller simplified 
models  one  can  derive  many  useful  theorems.    For  practical  policy  work  those  simplifying 
assumptions are relaxed.  Many of the rational expectations/sticky price models listed in Figure 1 
are more complex and have time varying risk premia in the term structure of interest rates, an 
exchange rate channel, and more than one country. 
   
Of course, macroeconomists should try to improve their models in whatever ways they think can 
make  them  more  useful  for  policymakers.  Many  have  been  working  on  improving  our 
understanding of the credit channel, a worthy task.  An implication of my research findings is that 
we need to do more work on ―political macroeconomics.‖  In particular, we need to explain and 
understand why policymakers moved in such an interventionist direction despite the research 
that stressed predictable rule-like monetary and fiscal policy.  Once we understand that, practical 
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